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In recent years, there has been a proliferation of non-state actors that have proven to be a 
credible threat to the survival of states and mankind. These non-state actors are strong not 
only in number and ammunition but also economically. In the event a sovereign state is 
attacked or threatened to be attacked, it is within its rights to defend itself and its people. 
Historically, the right of self-defence in international law could only be invoked as between 
states. The question as to whether the inherent right of self-defence arises in the case where 
the attacker is not a state under international law, has been seen to creep  into numerous legal 
discussions recently, as a result of the emergence of these dangerous non-state actors all over 
the world, and subsequently, retaliatory actions by states in the façade of self-defence. This 
paper intends to analyse the provisions of international law to determine what the future holds, 
if at all the international community is to curb the threat posed by these non-state actors while 
still upholding the spirit and purpose of the United Nations Charter, by preventing the 
unilateral recourse to use of force by states. The paper finds that, self-defence against non-
state actors should be permitted for states but with various limits in the law. The right should 
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CHAPTER 1  
RESEARCH PROPOSAL 
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The general obligation not to use force in international law is jus cogens in character.1 Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force among member states.2 There 
however exists Charter exceptions to the general rule found in Article 51.3 The interpretat ion 
of the UN Charter as regards the Charter exception is however not clear and is a point of 
contention in the international community. Some scholars take the restrictive view, while 
others take the permissive view of the issue.4  
There has been a recent proliferation of non-state actors launching attacks against the 
territories of sovereign states. These NSAs in the world today are strong in ammunition, in 
number and economically, just like states and therefore have the power to launch attacks that 
may very well be described as threatening to mankind. States, having been governed by the 
legal parameters of international law as regards the use of force are considerably different 
from NSAs such as terrorists5, and expecting states to deal with the latter, in the event they 
attack or show probability of attacking, the same way as the former is unrealistic.6. It is 
further known that no government can be held responsible for the conduct of rebellious 
groups, committed in violation of its authority7, where it is itself not guilty of breach of good 
faith or of negligence in suppressing insurrection, when the structures and organizations of 
the movement are and remain independent of the state.8 Self-defence against NSAs 
                                                                 
1 Military and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v United States), Merits, 
Judgement, ICJ Reports, 1986, 14.  
2 Article 2(4), Charter of the UN, 1945.  
3 Nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if armed attack 
occurs against a member of the UN’. 
4 The restrictive view, is that the UN Charter gives a total ban on the use of force, and when self-defence is 
permitted, it is only within the limits of article 51. The second view, is  the permissive one, where proponents 
of this school of thought expand the limits of use of force, having the opinion that there are many more 
circumstances where force may be used other than just when a state has suffered an actual attack from 
another. 
5 In the world of today, NSAs are clandestine, astute and sharp witted. The credibility of any law is its ability 
to evolve and deal with the current issues that face the international community. 
6 Dupuy, P-M, and Kerbrat Y, Droit International Public, 10th Ed, Paris: Dalloz, 2010. 
7 Brownlie I, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford University Press, 1963. 
8 Brownlie I, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 1963. 
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emanating from the territory of a sovereign state is a tough legal question and in analysing 
its legitimacy, a number of issues need to be determined.9  
Kenya launched an offensive operation10 against Al Shabaab on October 2015, dubbed 
Operation Linda Nchi.11 There was a joint communique sent to the UNSC, by Kenya and 
the Transitional Government of Somalia detailing the reasons and justifications for the 
invasion.12 The reasons the communique presented was among others that there have been 
unprecedented escalation of threats to the country’s national security, through the violent 
incessant infringement of Kenya’s territory and Kenya therefore, had to invoke its 
responsibility to protect itself from these threats.13  
This research, will set out to analyse the legal parameters surrounding state’s rights of self-
defence against a threat by a NSA, specifically whether, it is legal to invade the sovereignty 
of other states, where the actions of a NSA cannot really be attributed to it. Where then, is 
the line drawn between legal pre-emption and unlawful aggression? An in depth analysis of 
Kenya’s incursion into Somalia in 2011 will be conducted against the backdrop of these. 
With deference to the history and importance of UN Charter in this body of law, an attempt 
is made to show that the interpretation of the law ought to be laid out in clarity, to avoid the 
threat of the proliferation of unilateral use of unlawful force. 
  
                                                                 
9 Where the state was complicit or actively supporting NSAs, or where it failed to exercise due diligence to 
prevent the NSA, or where they may have exercised due diligence but it was nonetheless unable or is 
unwilling to prevent the attack or further attacks.  
10 The Kenyan government has characterized the invasion as one of self-defence, invoking Article 51 of the 
UN Charter. 
11 <http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/operation-linda-nchi> on 29th January 2016. 
12 UNSC, S/2011/646 (2011), Republic of Kenya, Letter dated 17 October 2011 from the permanent 
representative of Kenya to the UN addressed to the president of the UNSC, 1.  
13 UNSC, S/2011/646 (2011), 2. 
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
The Charter exception in Article 51 of the UN Charter presumes, but does not adequately 
state whether the right to self-defence only arises when a state suffers attack from another 
state.14 The realities of the world order that attacks emanate from NSAs such as terrorist 
organizations, pose considerable difficulty in the law. The fact that some states have justified 
their retaliatory attacks15, using the loopholes Article 51 of the charter, necessitates a review 
of the interpretation of the law, in order to prevent the very real threat of unilateral force 
being used in the world over in the name of self-defence.  
 
JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY  
The proliferation of sharp, strong-in-number and support, dangerous armed groups from 
states in conflict which cannot adequately stop these armed groups, justifies a review of the 
interpretation of the law. There is needed consensus, if at all there is to be a balance between 
the protections of future generations from the scourge of war, Vis-à-vis the immediate 
destruction of these armed groups.16 The law needs to be progressive and tailor made to the 
realities of the new world order, and this research intends in the end, to provide an adequate 
solution and recommendation to the problem.  
 
STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES  
General Objective  
The general objective of this research is to sufficiently discuss the legitimacy in the law of 
use of force in self-defence against NSAs.  
Specific Objectives  
1. To tailor the discussion to analysing the issue of self-defence, in response to armed 
attack from NSAs and what legal implications that has on states. 
                                                                 
14 Franck T, Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks . Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
15 These states are such as the United States against Afghanistan, Israel against Hezbollah, Colombia against 
the FARC and Turkey against the PKK. 




2. To analyse the legal parameters that surround state responsibility for NSAs in a bid 
to determine the legality of a state invading the sovereignty of another while claiming 
self-defence. 
3. To carry out a study of  the Kenyan invasion of  Somalia in attack against the Al-
Shabaab as well as brief discussions of other cases of the same as well in the world 
in a bid to determine the legitimacy of self-defence of this manner.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. Is it legally justifiable, for a state to claim self-defence against NSAs in the territory 
of another sovereign state?  
2. What are the legal parameters surrounding the attribution of state responsibility for 
NSAs within a state’s territory? 
 
HYPOTHESIS  
Self-defence by a state against attacks by NSAs emanating from the territory of sovereign 
states is permitted in International Law. The right of self-defence as stipulated by Article 51 
envisages not only self-defence against states but also against NSAs as well as against not 
only the use of force, but also the threat of use of force.  
 
METHODOLOGY  
The methodology adopted in this paper will be desktop research through the use of library 
sources, internet sources, international law instruments, international resolutions, books, 
journal articles, judicial and arbitral jurisprudence and analysis of scholarly writings on the 
circumstances states may claim resort to use self-defence and the legality of this. A study of 




THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
This research paper will primarily take the legal realist theory of law while also minimally 
focusing on the positivist theory of law in some aspects.  
The legal realist approach, posited by Oliver Wendell Holmes17 says that the law ultimate ly, 
is not an abstract of rules but derives force from the prevailing social interests. Justice 
Holmes posited that the life of the law was not logic, but rather, experience.18 This theory 
states that most times, judges, influenced by other societal influences, make the law what it 
is and that the driving force of law comes from actual practice and not from abstract rules. 19 
Because of this, the legal realist school also posits that law ought to be guided by 
considerations of the effects it has on social welfare of the people it guides.  
This research will use the legal realist theory to argue that international law should be 
tailored to the ultimate good of society, considering the emerging threats by NSAs. The law 
should work progressively, and judges of the international courts as well as the internationa l 
institutions such as the Security Council should influence the interpretation of the law in a 
way that ensures the societal welfare of states is catered for.   
The study will demonstrate the real time situations in the world, and the realist approach to 
the law will help give a deeper understanding of the function of the law in this case, taking 
cognizance of the realities that the world faces. This paper largely recommends tailoring the 
law to be progressive and address the realities that face states today, as the legal realist 
approach proposes, in that the law should be tied to the real world outcomes.20  
This paper also takes the positivist approach as posited by Hans Kelsen, in the pure theory 
of law21, describing the law as binding norms, by examining the UN Charter, case law as 
well as legal writings to determine the exact legal parameters of the law of the use of force. 
The positivist approach will enable a conclusive look into the proper procedure and limits in 
the resort to force by states which will aid in the analysis of the issue. 
 
 
                                                                 
17 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr, The Common Law. Holmes, Little, Brown, 1963. 
18 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr, The Common Law, 1963. 
19 <https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ legal_realis m > on 20th February 2016. 
20 <https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ legal_realis m > on 20th February 2016. 
21 Kelsen H, ‘The Pure theory of law’, Berkeley University of California Press, 2nd ed, 2002.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
There exists a wealth of scholarship on the issue of use of force in international law. There 
is no dispute that use of force is strictly forbidden in the international community as is 
stipulated by the UN Charter. Notable however, is that there exists a very wide variety of 
interpretation of the law as regards the restrictive and expansive views of the law on the use 
of force and its exceptions thereof. The main international instrument on the use of force is 
the UN Charter. The ICJ decisions as well as General Assembly and Security Council 
resolutions form a broad part of the literature on the issue.  
 
On Use of Force and Self-Defence  
Charter of the UN.22 The UN Charter under Article 2(4) prohibits the resort to force, with 
only two exceptions: The UNSC authorization of force and the right of self-defence is found 
in Article 51. Article 51 refers to an “inherent” right of self-defence but also notes that self-
defence arises only if an armed attack occurs.  
The World Summit Outcome23 which reviewed the UN Charter and the operation of the 
organization, agreed to reconfirm the Charter rules as written. On self-defence, the document 
states in paragraph 78, “We reiterate the importance of addressing international challenges 
and problems by strictly abiding by the Charter and the principles of international law.”  
Ian Brownlie in his book, ‘International Law and the Use of Force by States’,24 strongly 
rejects the expansive approach to use of force. The book explains use of force, the limits of 
the use of force in the charter as well as in customary international law.    
Christine Gray in ‘International law and the use of force’25 relies on actual evidence of 
state practice and opinio juris  to show that the trials that states have to have a relaxed 
interpretation of the Charter have failed. Gray finds significant evidence that most 
governments favour strict interpretation of the UN Charter rules on the use of force. 
                                                                 
22 Charter of the UN, 1945.  
23 UN Doc. A/60/L.1. (2005) UN GAOR, World Summit Outcome. 
24 Brownlie, I, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 1963. 
25 Gray, C, International Law and the Use of Force, 3d ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. 
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Christine Gray 26discusses the rise in use of force cases, including cases concerning the 
right of self-defence, before the ICJ. She contends that the decisions indicate ICJ deference 
to the Security Council, which is still in support of the restrictive view. 
Arend, Antony Clark and Robert Beck in their paper ‘International law and the use of 
force’ write on the permissive and expansive view of the law. They contend that state 
practice shows clearly the uncertainties of the limits of jus ad bellum. They aver that there 
is no clear prohibition on self-defence to counter terrorist attacks.  
Franck Thomas in the ‘Recourse to Force: State Action against threats and armed 
attacks’27, argues that custom has evolved and that there tends to be an acceptance of the 
legality of many actions in international law in the name of self-defence and sometimes 
humanitarian intervention. He supports the expansive view.  
Dupuy Pierre and Yann Kerbat28review the UN Charter rules and apply them to the 
contemporary problems of terrorism and non-state-actor uses of force. As a solution, 
emphasis is put on the collective decision making as with the UNSC rather than individua l 
resort to use of force.  
Greenwood C in ‘International Law and the Pre-emptive use of force: Afghanistan, Al 
Qaeda and Iraq’29 suggests that in the legal framework on the use of force, there are certain 
instances where self defence against threats by terrorists is justified, provided the set 
conditions are justified. The paper focuses on the threat from international terrorism in the 
situation in Iraq.  
On State Responsibility  
The International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of states for 
internationally wrongful acts,30 consolidates the law on state responsibility. These rules 
form the accepted international law standards.  
                                                                 
26 Gray C, ‘The Use and Abuse of the ICJ: Cases concerning the Use of Force after Nicaragua’, European 
Journal of International Law, 867–905, 2003.  
27 Franck T, Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks . Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
28 Dupuy, P-M, and Kerbrat Y, Droit International Public, 2010. 
29 Greenwood C, ‘International law and the pre-emptive use of force: Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and Iraq’ San 
Diego International Journal, 7, 2003. 
30 UN Doc. A/56/10, International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts. Report of the ILC on the Work of Its 53rd Session, 2001. 
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Ian Brownlie’s book, ‘International Law and the Use of Force by States’31, is the most 
authoritative book on state responsibility. The book properly analyses the law on state 
responsibility, analysing instances that responsibility can be attributed to a state.  
Tom Ruys and Sten Verhoeven’s  Attacks by Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence,32 
succinctly takes into account the rules on state responsibility, and in analysing them comes 
up with the position that looking at state responsibility in the extreme fashion is not desirable, 
and that ultimately it is the substantial involvement test that should be taken when 
considering whether any action may be attributed to the state.  
 
LIMITATIONS OF STUDY  
In regards to the study on Operation Linda Nchi, the paper is limited to desktop research, as 
it is not possible to carry out field research and interview the key stakeholders, such as 
government officials, and officials in the Kenyan Army.  
Documents that led up to the decision of Kenya’s invasion in Somalia are part of confidentia l 
government information. This is a limitation because of the fact that the research cannot gain 
these documents to establish the exact factual circumstances that led to the invasion.  
 
CHAPTER BREAKDOWN  
Chapter 1: 
Introduction and Background of the study.  
Chapter 2:  
Operation Linda Nchi – Kenya.  
Chapter 3:  
General Law on the Use of Force and Self Defence.  
Chapter 4:  
                                                                 
31 Brownlie, I, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 1963. 
32 Ruys T and Verhoeven S, Attacks By Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence, Oxford Journal of 




State Responsibility and Attribution.  
Chapter 5:  





OPERATION LINDA NCHI – KENYA’S INCURSION INTO SOMALIA 
2011. 
INTRODUCTION  
Self defence against NSAs poses a great challenge to states in the world today. This chapter 
will focus on the background of the Kenyan incursion in Somalia in 2011, the Al Shabaab, 
the reasons and justifications by the Kenyan state, whether the Somali state is responsible 
for the attacks by the Al Shabaab and the legal procedure in general followed by Kenya. The 
paper shall outline this real life case to prove further the hypothesis that in the current world 
order, there exists an issue in international law, in terms of the legal parameters in the use of 
force, self-defence and state responsibility as regards terrorist attacks by NSAs emanating 
from the territory of a state.  
 
AL SHABAAB 
Al Shabaab, is an Islamic militant group, with roots in Somalia. Al Shabaab, also known as 
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen means ‘youth movement’ or ‘movement of striving 
youth’. The militant group, is said to have been formed in 2004, as the militant wing of the 
Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which was the larger network of Islamic militant tribes that 
controlled Southern and Central Somalia.33  
The ICU was a group of Sharia courts that had united in Somalia for the purposes of forming 
a rival administration to the TFG (TFG) of Somalia.34 The ICU for a very long time, up until 
2006 had controlled most of Southern Somalia, and only the Northern regions were not under 
their control.35 After a few battles in 2006 in some major towns in Somalia, the ICU lost 
much of their territory, and moved towards the town of Kismayo, but later abandoned it, 
early 2007.  
 
                                                                 
33 <https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html> on 3rd December 2016. 
34 <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/61> on 10th December 2016. 
35 <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/61> on 10th December 2016. 
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Al Shabaab waged an insurgency against Somalia’s transitional government, in 2007, and 
since then the fighting between Al Shabaab and the Somali government has erupted.36 Since 
then, the group has described itself as waging war against Somali’s TFG and the AU Mission 
to Somalia (AMISOM) that was formed by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, 
and approved by the UNSC in 2007. 37 In the year 2012, Al Shabaab claimed allegiance to 
Al Qaeda. 
AMISOM is a peacekeeping mission operated by the AU which was created to replace the 
IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia, which was proposed for peacekeeping in Somalia 
during the last phases of the civil war.38 AMISOM was authorised by the Security Council 
in the year 2007, with a limited mandate of six months which was later renewed. The main 
aim of AMISOM was to support national reconciliation, and to take all measures as it 
deemed fit for the maintenance of peace and security through ensuring the Al Shabaab is 
curbed through offensive operations against the group.39  This clearly shows why the Al 
Shabaab has continued and will continue to fight the mission. 
 
THE AL SHABAAB AND KENYA 
Reference is had to Al Shabaab in this context as an example of States’ struggles against 
NSAs acting from the territory of another State but not under its direct control. Al Shabaab 
is a military group with its roots in Somalia and as will be shown in this part, Kenya launched 
an offensive against the militant group in 2011. There are many factors in international law 
that come about, in particular as regards the legitimacy of the fight against this militant group 
that resides in the territory of Somalia.  
In 2011, Kenya launched an offensive against the militant group Al Shabaab in Somalia, 
dubbed ‘Operation Linda Nchi’. Operation Linda Nchi, which means ‘Operation Protect the 
Nation’ will be a big part of the discussions in this paper. The context which Kenya launched 
the offensive against Somalia was the attacks that were carried out in Kenya, which were 
believed to be by the Al Shabaab.40 There was a chain of kidnappings that triggered this. A 
British man and his wife were kidnapped from a resort in Lamu and killed, a French woman 
was kidnapped from her home in October, and in another incident, two Spanish aid workers 
                                                                 
36 <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/61> on 10th December 2016. 
37 <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/61> Accessed 10th December 2016. 
38 <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/> on 2nd January 2017. 
39 <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/> on 2nd January 2017.  
40 See more at <http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/operation-linda-nchi> on 20th June 2016. 
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were kidnapped from Daadab Refugee camp.41 The terrorist group claimed responsibility for 
these attacks.42  
The kidnappings, formed the basis of Kenya’s invasion in Somalia, on the grounds of self-
defence.43 The full text on the grounds of Kenya’s incursion is found in the joint letter to the 
UNSC by Kenya and Somalia dated October 17th44, in which among other issues, the Kenyan 
government cited the attacks on Kenyans and foreigners by the Al Shabaab as a threat to the 
security of the nation and a reason for remedial and pre-emptive action to be taken to 
preserve the integrity of Kenya, and secure peace and security.45 In this, Kenya invoked 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, which as mentioned in Chapter 1, enforces the inherent right 
of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the 
UN, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain peace.46 This 
however notably violated the UNSC Arms Embargo that was imposed on Somalia in 1992.47 
This arms embargo stated that there was a general and complete embargo on all delivery of 
weapons and military equipment to Somalia as well as called on all states to refrain from all 
action which might contribute to increasing tension in Somalia.48 Kenya, in choosing to 
invade Somalia in pursuit of Al Shabaab, was violating the requirement that all countries 
should have refrained from all actions that could contribute to increasing tensions in 
Somalia.  
 
REASONS FOR KENYAN INCURSION IN SOMALIA  
The reasons for the invasion are found in the joint letter by Somalia and Kenya to the UNSC. 
Kenya, was in direct consultations with the TFG of Somalia and noted the violent and 
incessant infringement of Kenya’s territorial integrity by the Al Shabaab and agreed that a 
pre-emptive invasion to secure the security and peace of both countries was necessary. The 
two countries agreed that they would continue working together in a common political and 
security strategy to stabilize Somalia and get rid of the threats of the Al Shabaab militants, 
                                                                 
41< http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/operation-linda-nchi> on 20th June 2016. 
42 < http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/operation-linda-nchi> on 20th June 2016. 
43 Kenya: Operation Linda Nchi - Kenya's Endless War, Daily Nation, 16th October 2015. 
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201510170130.html> on 22nd June 2016. 
44 Article 51, Charter of the UN, 1945. 
45 UNSC, S/2011/646 (2011), 2.   
46 Article 51, Charter of the UN, 1945. 
47 UNSC/RES/733 (1992) Implementing an Arms Embargo on Somalia.  
48 UNSC/RES/733 (1992). 
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as they were a common enemy to both countries.49 They also committed to undertaking 
coordinated attacks in pursuit of the Al Shabaab elements. This, as we see here, brings out 
the issue of the use of force against NSAs and self-defence.  
This, was against the backdrop of the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, which was noted 
to have since then escalated the crisis situation and turned into a myriad of threats to not only 
Somalia, but also other neighbouring states such as Kenya. The letter also stated that despite 
efforts by Somalia through the AU and IGAD, to call upon the International community to 
intervene in the situations, these calls have been consistently ignored or met with inadequate 
unsustainable support.  
They also noted that after the TFG of Somalia defeated the Al Shabaab, the security situation 
improved but that the group had since regrouped and consequently posed a significant threat 
to peace and security in the region and beyond. The Al Shabaab have since then infiltrated 
Kenya, and committed crimes including kidnappings of foreign and local civilians, 
destruction of property and the disruptions of humanitarian efforts for the refugees in 
Daadab.50  
These activities, taken as a whole according to the letter, posed serious threats to public 
safety and security within Kenya. Against the backdrop of all these, the letter noted that 
Kenya and Somalia were justified and warranted to carry out military efforts to forestall the 
actions of Al Shabaab to terrorise civilians.51   
 
LEGAL PROCEDURE USED BY KENYA  
Article 51 of the UN Charter states that;  
‘…Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take 
at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.’ 
Kenya, as a member of the UN is expected, in the exercise of its inherent right of self-
defence, to report all measures of self-defence to the Security Council. Kenya, after invoking 
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article 51 as the basis of its invasion in Somalia, did this through the joint communique with 
Somalia.  
It should be noted however that Kenya, did not gain the Security Council’s approval for the 
invasion. Security Council has not addressed the issue to this date.52 The question then begs 
as to what exactly is the legal status of the invasion, without the United Nation’s approval/ 
disapproval. It has been stated that silence means acquiescence in the forum of the UNSC.53 
It is acknowledged that a state, under customary international law can only have the right to 
use force on foreign soil without the UNSC approval when all peaceful means to the conflict 
have been exhausted, when the threat is so imminent, leaving absolutely no alternative than 
to resort to force to defend themselves from an attack.54 It should also be noted, that once 
the Security Council steps in to maintain international peace and security, the state is to cease 
using force.55 The expectation here is that when such a situation occurs, the UNSC will take 
action in the fastest way possible according to its mandate in international law.56 What is the 
legal status of such an operation when the Security Council has not taken the measures 
necessary to restore peace and security?  
Kenya, argued that the invasion was lawful as it was in accordance with Article 51 of the 
charter, and that it had the full support of the Somali government.57 The Minister for Defence 
of Kenya at the time stated that the invasion was in the best interests of Kenya and that the 
country was doing all in its power within legal means to safeguard the security of its 
boundaries.58 It should be noted however that the joint communique referred to in the 
preceding paragraphs, did not explicitly authorise Kenyan military operations on Somalia, 
but impliedly did so by introducing the aspect of ‘cooperation’ of both governments in 
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undertaking the security and military operations. In addition, a study of the arms embargo 
imposed on Somalia by the UNSC brings into question the legality of the position that Kenya 
took as regards this issue. In this tangent then, has Kenya illegally invaded the state of 
Somalia, by her justifications being without adequate legal merit?  
  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RESPONSE  
The International Community has been seen to implicitly forming significant opinion juris 
that shows that such invasions such as the one Kenya carried out are in some way 
legitimate.59 Kenya has received widespread support for the invasion, by the United States 
that have been key in providing support through drones and other military tactics, to help in 
the fight against the Al Shabaab. In addition, states such as France and Israel have given 
significant support to the Kenyan Military. The AU as a whole has also supported Kenya’s 
military operations.60 The AU can also be said to be implicitly giving a favourable response 
to Kenya’s operations through the creation of AMISOM, which would eventually absorb the 
activities that Kenya was carrying out. The UNGA has also proven its support implic it ly 
through the support of the AMISOM. It has, among other things passed resolutions whose 
subject is the funding of AMISOM activities.61 This, interestingly followed a resolution by 
the Security Council stating its intention to establish a peace keeping union in Somalia as a 
follow-on force to the activities of AMISOM.62 These all show the express as well as implic it 
approval of the missions in Somalia, including Kenya’s.  
This support has been more so, in the subsequent armed attacks by the Al Shaaab that Kenya 
has been a victim of, such as the Westgate Shopping Mall attack in 2013, and the Garissa 
University College attack in 2015, just to mention a few of the numerous attacks that Al 
Shabaab has claimed responsibility for.63 It can be thus said, that this support is slowly seen 
to be building custom in International law that a state can act in self-defence within the 
meaning of article 51, against a NSA emanating from the territory of another state.64  
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This can be likened to the Ethiopian invasion in Somalia in 2006, against the ICU in Somalia, 
in which the Ethiopian state invoked article 51. Here, the AU was in support of the action, 
and only one state at the time in Security Council challenged Ethiopia’s assertion of the 
right.65 There are many other cases in which the International Community has had to deal 
with this issue. These will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter.  
In conclusion, it is clear that the invasion into Somalia by Kenya has many legal 
implications. This paper however posits that the Security Council’s silence on the matter or 
lack of explicit statement, coupled with the subsequent resolutions in favour of the missions 
in Somalia, could be said to be an implicit acquiescence of the right of self-defence against 
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INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE AND SELF- 
DEFENCE VIS-À-VIS NON-STATE ACTORS 
INTRODUCTION 
Many can concede that the notions of warfare in pre-1945 and those of today are strikingly 
different.66 The current world order poses greater dangers in terms of the proliferations of 
new methods of warfare such as the presence of weapons of mass destruction as well as new 
actors in armed conflicts. It is the assertion of this paper that the drafters of the UN Charter, 
provided for the legal limits of the use of force, only bearing the ‘state’ as is defined in the 
Montevideo convention67 in mind. We now however live in a nuclear era and NSAs have 
emerged in the plane of armed conflict, and granted, most of these pose a significant to the 
survival of states today, as post-1945 practice has shown. The purpose of this chapter is to 
carry out a study of the law of the use of force and self-defence in a bid to analyse on a 
backdrop of the law, whether states are justified in claiming self defence against NSAs in 
the territory of another sovereign state. In doing so, the chapter will begin on a discussion of 
the history and the current law on the use of force and then the exceptions thereof, 
specifically that of self-defence.  
 
USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  
HISTORY 
Historically, wars were classified as just or unjust. There was a religious aspect to war, and 
many times, priests were the people to declare whether war was just or not.68 With the rise 
of sovereign states, the prerogative of war was with states themselves. Under the concept of 
‘just war’ as defined by Hugo Grotius, there needed to be a wrong done to the state or a right 
illegally denied. War was illegal unless justified by a ‘just cause’.69 This proved problematic 
as many states unilaterally waged war against each other as they believed they had ‘just 
cause’ to do so, but this was not objective. In 1648, the peace of Westphalia70 made states 
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equal and this was in tandem with the concept of ‘sovereign right to wage war’. This meant 
that every sovereign was right to wage war for any reason they deemed fit.71  
After the occurrence of the First World War, there was a clear need for a system which would 
solve disputes without resorting to war. The birth of the League of Nations in 1919, was a 
step towards this direction. The members agreed that they were to strive for internationa l 
peace. First, there was the presence of a Council of the League, which all members would 
submit to in case any dispute arose. If they did not agree with the decision, they would not 
go to war until after three months and this was to be a cooling off period. The League of 
Nations regulated and restricted war in these ways but did not prohibit it.72 It failed because 
states could still resort to war, at the end of its guidelines. The Kellogg-Briand Pact73 in 
1928, between some states in the world was another law that attempted to ensure 
international peace. In this pact, the states agreed that they would only solve disputes through 
peaceful means and condemned war.  
 
THE UN CHARTER AND THE USE OF FORCE 
The UN Charter was adopted in the year 1945 after the Second World War. The purpose of 
the UN Charter is alluded to in the preamble of the Charter, and this is to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war74 through uniting to maintain peace and security.  
The preamble to this effect also states that all the member states shall ensure that armed force 
shall not be used, save in common interest.75 In relation to this, one of the purposes of the 
UN Charter as states by Article 1 (1) is;  
‘To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment 
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or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace;’76 
Article 2 of the Charter then states that in pursuit of the above purposes and others, all 
members and others shall;  
2(3) - ‘Settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.’77 
2(4) - ‘Refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the UN.’78 
From the above, it can be seen that the adoption of UN Charter was a step towards the right 
direction in terms of maintaining international peace and security in the world. Article 2(4) 
bans the use of force in relations in the international community and has gained the status of 
jus cogens in international law today. Being a jus cogens provision, means that it is a 
peremptory norm. Under the Vienna Convention, a peremptory norm is one which is 
universally accepted and recognised and to which no derogation is permitted and which can 
be modified only by a subsequent norm of international law having the same character.79 It 
is therefore recognised universally that the threat or use of force is prohibited. The Charter 
however contains exceptions to this general rule, which shall be discussed below.  
The Charter gives the UNSC the explicit powers to deal with matters to do with actions with 
respect to the threat of peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression under Chapter VII.80 
This power, is under Article 39 in which the UNSC is given the powers to determine the 
existence of any threat to peace and decide which measures to take in order to maintain peace 
and security.81 This is one of the Charter exceptions to the general rule.  
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The other and most relevant Charter exception to the general rule is that which is contained 
in Article 51 of the Charter. This provision forms the basis of the discussion on self-defence. 
Article 51 states that; 82 
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security.  
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take 
at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.’ 
 
SELF DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  
Self Defence in international law today has its basis in Article 51 of the Charter as shown 
above. As will however be shown, Self-defence not only has its basis in the Charter, but also 
in Customary International law as well. The two are said to work side by side, and this part 
shall carry out a discussion of both instances, to ultimately answer the question of whethe r 
this right exists against NSAs operating in the territory of a sovereign state.  
 
SELF DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51  
Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that;  
‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.’83 
It is therefore important in analysing the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter 
to look at the right in totality in the context of Article 2(4). It would therefore not be far-
fetched to argue that since this is the case, under the reading of the Vienna Convention, 
                                                                 
82 Article 51, UN Charter. 
83 Article 31(1), UN Charter. 
22 
 
Article 51 is a permitted derogation from the jus cogens norm, which then gives it the same 
rank in the hierarchy of norms.84 Under Article 51, states have an ‘inherent’ right to defend 
themselves against an armed attack. This article also contains procedural obligations, namely 
that once the Security Council has taken adequate measures to maintain peace and security, 
the state taking action in self-defence shall cease all its actions.85 The other is that any action 
taken in self-defence must be reported to the UNSC immediately.  
As regards the discussion of this paper, i.e. self-defence against NSAs, it should be noted 
that there are three points of contention that this emerging issue raises. First is as regards the 
authorship of the armed attack, and second, as regards the use of the word ‘armed attack’. 
Thirdly, this paper identifies as an issue the right of self-defence against the threat of the use 
of force’.  
As regards the first issue, this is a problem because the drafters of the Charter omitted to 
specifically state the author of the armed attack and only stated that that the right of self-
defence existed when an ‘armed attack occurs’. It is believed by many writers and teachers 
of International law that in 1945, the drafters meant that the authors of the armed attacks 
were only states, because granted, at the time, no other actors had the economic and physical 
power to launch armed attacks. Assuming the omission was intentional so as to cater for 
changing times and situations, this paper posits that considering the proliferation of armed 
attacks by NSAs in the world now,  the lack of clarity as regards the authorship of the attacks 
in the charter, causes significant loopholes in practice and needs to be looked into.  
The second issue is considerably in the view of this paper harder to deal with, as some may 
argue that it is explicitly in the Charter that self-defence only exists when an armed attack 
has already occurred. The Charter has not explicitly defined an armed attack. The UNGA 
has come up with the definition of aggression, which partly, some have resorted to use as 
the definition of an armed attack. The ICJ has however attempted to come up with decisions 
as regards this, but impliedly adopted the definition of aggression as the definition of an 
armed attack.    
As regards the third issue, it is averred by this paper, that because Article 2(4) mentions that 
the prohibition exists on not only the use but also the ‘threat’ of use of force86, then the right 
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of self-defence should exist when a state is defending itself from not only attacks that have 
already occurred, but also those that have been ‘threatened’ but not exactly materialised. 
 
AUTHORSHIP OF ARMED ATTACK  
The ICJ has made pronouncements on the issue of authorship of attacks in many of its 
judgements including the Nicaragua case87, the Armed Activities88 case as well as the Wall 
advisory89 case. The ability of a state to defend itself against attacks from a NSA based in 
the territory of state, who may not have been involved in those attacks themselves, , is quite 
understandably controversial, unsettled and vague.90 The paper however intends to show that 
the approach the ICJ has taken in the Nicaragua case and more such as the Wall Advisory 
opinion and Armed Activities case (Congo v Uganda), while well informed cannot91 be said 
to be adequately reflect the state of affairs in the current world  order.92 It is important to 
note that the ICJ decision in Nicaragua stated that notwithstanding its main decision, the 
reliance of a state on such an exception would if shared in principle by other states tend 
towards a modification of customary international law.93 
In reference to the UN Charter, Article 51 does not explicitly state the author of the armed 
attacks. This brings difficulty in the interpretation of the law, as in the world today, there has 
been a proliferation of armed dangerous NSAs. The law, especially as regards an issue as 
important as this, needs to be clear and not vague or leave the issue to interpretation by states. 
NSAs may threaten the very existence of states and on a different tangent, states may 
unilaterally abuse their right to self-defence under the Charter.94  
State practice after 1945 has been said to suggest that armed attacks from NSAs can be 
regarded as armed attacks within the meaning of article 51. The examples explored in this 
part shall be in brief; the United States’ attacks against Afghanistan, the Israeli attacks 
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against Hezbollah, Turkey’s operations against PKK and Colombia’s operations against 
FARC.95  
It is important to note that the ICJ as mentioned above, has made judgements against this. In 
the Wall Advisory opinion, the court rejected Israel’s argument that the wall built in 
Palestinian territory was a legitimate practice of self-defence.96 In the Armed Activities case, 
the court held that Uganda had no right to self-defence against a rebel group that emanated 
from the DRC.97 A number of judges have rejected this view however, the most notable 
being Judge Simma in the Armed Activities case who noted that the court could not continue 
carrying on the restrictive interpretation of Article 51 taking into account state practice and 
the development of the issue in the Security Council.98 An example of the pronouncement 
of the Security Council on this issue is the resolutions it granted in favour of the United 
States after the September 11th attacks, recognising that the USA had been a victim of an 
armed attack and had the right to respond, even though the attacks were not authored by a 
state, which is the ICJ’s interpretation of Article 51.99  
 
Operation Enduring Freedom - Us against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan 
The terrorists group Al Qaeda committed the September 2001 attacks against the United 
States. It was said that the Taliban group in Afghanistan harboured and actively supported 
Al Qaeda. The US after the attacks informed the UNSC that it was carrying out attacks100 
against Al Qaeda training camps and Taliban military camps in Afghanistan referring to their 
right of self-defence against ‘armed’ attacks within the meaning of Article 51.101 Although 
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the UN did not specifically mandate the actions of the US,102 a number of states worldwide 
and other international organisations viewed the actions of the US to be a legitimate form of 
self-defence.103 In addition to this, Resolutions 1368 and 1373 reaffirmed the right of US’ 
individual and collective self-defence.104 NATO and The European Union also supported 
the actions of the United States.105 The operation enduring freedom is therefore a very 
important example of state practice showing that self-defence allows for attacks by NSAs 
that need not be attributed to the state itself to qualify as armed attacks within the meaning 
of article 51.106 Attribution and state responsibility still however remains an important 
component of this discussion and of this example too, as the Taliban was said to be 
‘harbouring and ‘actively supporting’ the terrorist group, and this will be discussed in the 
next chapter.  
 
Operation Sun - Turkey against PKK in Iraq (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)  
In the year 2007, militants from the PKK attacked and killed Turkish troops in a number of 
cross border attacks. The militants were based in Northern Iraq. Following this, a number of 
airstrikes were launched against their hideouts in Iraqi territory. Turkey was seen not to be 
in conformity with requirements of the Charter, as they did not report their actions to the 
UNSC, even though in a number of instances,107 Turkey claimed that their actions were in 
self-defence.108 It should be noted that most states refrained however from commenting on 
the legality of Turkey’s actions, but the one’s that did, did not deny that the attacks against 
Turkey warranted self-defence.109 Some countries like the US and others provided 
intelligence and other forms of military help to Turkey, but never unequivocally approved 
or condemned Turkey’s actions.110 The EU seemed to be in support of Turkey’s actions as 
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they stated that they were in support of Turkey’s efforts to protect its population and fight 
terrorism, but stated that they should refrain from taking any illegal or disproportionate 
military action.111 State reactions in Turkey’s case have been vague but however still show 
that self-defence could and has been taken in response to armed attacks by NSAs.112 
 
Operation Change Direction – Israeli against Hezbollah in Lebanon  
 In the year 2006, Israel launched an operation against the militant group Hezbollah, in 
Lebanese territory because they were based in Lebanon. This was in response to attacks on 
Israel and a cross border attack which killed Israeli troops while others were captured.113 
Israel claimed the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter, and said they would 
take appropriate actions to end the survival of the terrorist group.114 There was wide 
acceptance by states worldwide that the attacks by Hezbollah were armed attacks and many 
were supportive of Israel’s right to act in self-defence. Argentina, the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and France among other asserted their support for Israel during a UNSC 
meeting.115 In the resolution 1701, the Security Council referred to the Hezbollah attacks 
and never explicitly rejected the self-defence right of Israel. This operation was however 
also characterised by a lot of criticism in regard to the disproportionate use of force that 
Israel used, rather than the actual substantive right of self-defence that Israel had. That, was 
not in contention.116 It is however important to note that in this case, Hezbollah was not 
exactly separate from the state of Lebanon as it is said to have a political wing which is part 
of the government of Lebanon.  
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OTHER INSTANCES OF STATE PRACTICE  
Australia, after an attack in Bali which involved some of its citizens, stated that they should 
have the right to attack under anticipatory self defence against terrorists in neighbouring 
countries.117  
Rwanda also invoked self-defence and gave as a justification the inability of the DRC in 
preventing Hutu rebels in 2004, and attacked the rebels in the DRC territory.118  
 
MEANING OF ARMED ATTACK  
A study of Article 51 once again brings considerable difficulty when looking at what exactly 
the meaning of the term ‘armed attack’ is. The question that lingers the most amongst others, 
is that of the threshold of attacks which would mean ‘armed attack’ within the meaning of 
Article 51.119 There has been a debate as to whether smaller successive attacks could be said 
to be combined to prove the existence of a high threshold of attacks which could be suffic ient 
to warrant to self-defence as was the case in the Al Shabaab attacks against Kenya before 
the incursion120  
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ declared that the definition of an armed attack was not 
provided in the UN Charter, 121 but attempted to state that armed attack was a subcategory 
of the definition of aggression as was given in Resolution 3314 of the UNGA.122 This paper 
however avers that there is still no consensus as regards what acts constitute an armed attack 
and the elements thereof, as the definition of aggression is too wide and consists of other 
kinds of attack and not only armed attack.  
 
SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST A ‘THREAT’ OF FORCE  
Article 51 should be read against a backdrop of Article 2(4). Article 2(4) bans not only the 
use of force, but also the threat of it. The premise of this part is that as Article 51 is the 
exception afforded to the rule in Article 2(4), it would not be far-fetched to say that states 
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should have the right to defend themselves against threats of force against them and not just 
actual use of force. The right of self-defence as stipulated in Article 51 however only arises 
when an ‘armed attack’ has occurred. The legal issue in contention in issue here is whether 
states can claim self-defence against a threat of use force by a NSA emanating from the 
territory of a state and the imminence thereof of an attack. Here, is the threat of use of force 
so instant and overwhelming such that it leaves no moment for deliberation and no other 
choice for the victim state but to resort to self-defence?  
In the view of the ICJ, the act of self-defence is only regarded as lawful if there is an actual 
armed attack; that states do not have the a right of collective or individual self-defence in 
response to attacks which do not constitute an armed attack.123 It has been stated that it would 
be a;  
‘travesty of the purposes of the Charter (the preservation of international peace and 
security) to compel a defending state to allow its assailant to deliver the first, and 
perhaps fatal blow; that to read Article 51 restrictively is to protect the aggressor’s 
right to the first strike.’124  
This is followed by the assertion that it is absurd for a state to have to wait for an armed 
attack to occur before taking any action to protect itself.125 In tandem with the realist 
approach to the law, this part will discuss the law as regards this issue against a backdrop of 
state practice after 1945, to get a better interpretation of Article 51 as read with Article 2(4). 
The Government of United Kingdom according to debates in the House of Lords have 
reiterated that the right of self-defence has been taken to include the instance where an armed 
attack is imminent.126 Here it should be noted that imminent as used is different from a more 
remote threat. It was on this basis for instance, that the UK participated in operation enduring 
freedom against Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.127 This is in agreement with the 
argument that depending on the circumstances, self-defence can be used against those who 
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harbour and plan and perpetrate attacks if the use of force in self-defence is necessary to 
avert the planned attacks. Kenya, in its invasion in Somalia claimed they were going to 
launch strikes to protect the state from the growing threat Al Shabaab posed in the country.  
It has been said that in response to terrorist groups, States should be able to use force where 
there is credible evidence of attacks, even where there is no precise evidence of the exact 
nature of the attack. There exist conditions in customary international law; namely that the 
use of armed force should be last resort, that it should be absolutely necessary to thwart the 
attack, that the attack must be imminent and that the force used must be proportionate to the 
threat that is faced.128 An important aspect is that of imminence. The position of Customary 
International Law on this matter is that the attack must be instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
choice or means for deliberation.129  
It is important in determining the extent of legality of this premise, that state practice as 
regards the issue is looked at. In this part, the following shall be studied in brief; Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the Six Day War, and the Osirak reactor case in Iraq. 
 
Cuban Missile Crisis  
In the year 1962, the Soviet Union was delivering armament to Cuba which according to US 
intelligence, could deploy nuclear missiles. The US considered a strike against Cuban 
territory to eliminate the missile systems as well as a naval blockade to stop further 
shipments to Cuba.130 Although the US did not claim Article 51 but Article 52 on the regional 
arrangements for maintaining international peace, this was all done to thwart the threat of 
nuclear weapon shipments to Cuba, and the US in these operations gained the regional 
support of the Organisation of American States. 
 
Six Day War – Israel  
In the year 1967, Israel launched pre-emptive attacks against Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The 
troops of these countries were said to be acting in hostility towards Israel. The three countries 
had then formed an alliance. Egypt, evicted the UN peace keeping corps from the Gaza strip 
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and issued threatening statements together with other Arab states who all proclaimed their 
intentions of Israel’s destruction.131 Egypt also imposed a naval blockade to cut off Israel’s 
access to the Red Sea. Israel then decided that with the aggressive actions, it would launch 
airstrikes on the three countries’ airfields, thereby neutralising all their air capabilities which 
ultimately aided in Israel’s success of the war in a matter of six days.132 Israel’s first 
argument was of Anticipatory self-defence but this failed largely due to the fact that Israel 
did not adhere to the requirements of anticipatory self-defence as stipulated in Customary 
International law when they continued attacking after the victory after the Arab states.133 
These were those of imminence, necessity and proportionality. Specifically, it was argues 
that Israel’s actions were not in any way proportional to the threat said to be faced. Israel 
then argued that the naval blockade by Egypt was an act of war and proof of hostile 
intentions. Still, even though many states sides with Israel, they did not approve of the 
anticipatory self-defence argument.134  
 
Osirak Reactor Case 
In the year 1981, Iraq was building a nuclear reactor with the French which was code-named 
Osirak. Iraq continuously denied the existence of the nuclear reactor, while still declaring its 
intention for acquiring nuclear weapons and using them against Israel, together with the 
hostile attitude it had towards the country.135 The reactor was said to be only for scientif ic 
research, but Iraq was purchasing higher quantities of Uranium than would be needed for 
scientific research and therefore Israel suspected the legitimacy of the reason. These reasons 
prompted Israel to launch an airstrike to destroy the reactor. Israel invoked anticipatory self-
defence and argued that the threat of use of nuclear weapons entitled it to act pre-emptive ly. 
Israel in part in its argument stated that technological advances warranted a broadening of 
the scope of self-defence as is in the Charter, to include situations in which a state acted pre-
emptively to thwart an attack. This is evidently self-defence against a ‘threat’ of use of force.  
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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE 
The Caroline Case136  
The Caroline case is often cited as the basis of the right of self-defence under customary 
international law. The Caroline incident occurred in the year 1837 and for this reason is 
rejected by many writers as basis for any display of state practice in regard to use of self-
defence as it is pre-1945, but has considerably generated a number of important rules to the 
CIL right of anticipatory self-defence and is therefore useful in this paper following the 
realist school of thought as many states have claimed this right.  
The Caroline was a steamer flying the US Flag which was being used to ferry reinforcements 
and supplies to the Canadian insurgents against British. After several incidents of the 
insurgents firing on the British troops, the British decided to cut off their supply line (The 
Caroline). They boarded the Caroline, burned it and sent it over the Niagara Falls.137 US 
secretary of state in a letter to Lord Ashburton of Britain, stated the following which later 
came to be the basis of some of the principles of anticipatory self-defence; imminence, 
necessity and proportionality.138 
"It will be for that Government to show a necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. …even 
supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the 
United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by 
the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within 
it."139 
It is suggested that the Caroline incident as well as State practice developing 150 years later 
has sufficiently developed a customary right to self-defence. That, the use of armed force 
and the violation of the territory of a state is justified as self-defence under the law where an 
armed attack is launched or threatened against a state which then warrants an urgent 
necessity of defensive action against that attack or threatened attack which is limited to the 
prevention of the attack, and there is no practicable alternative to that action in self-defence 
or the state which has the legal powers to stop the attack cannot or is unwilling.140  
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Anticipatory self-defence has been defined as the ability of a state to take measures aimed 
at countering the foreseen consequences of actions in violation of its territory.141 A state 
takes anticipatory self-defence against another state in anticipation of an attack by that state 
before that state can commence the attack. Anticipatory self-defence must be immediate and 
necessary. It is considered that in the event the UN Charter actions are delayed or inadequate 
as has been seen in many instances, it would be a failure of Article 1 the Charter to compel 
a state to allow its attacker to deliver the first blow which could turn out to be fatal.142  
 
Principles of Anticipatory Self defence  
The three principles of Webster’s formula are necessity, immediacy and proportionality and 
these serve to limit the right of self-defence under CIL.  
1. The threat must be imminent. Imminent here means that the threat must be instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice or means of deliberation.  
2. The action in self-defence must be necessary to protect against the threat.  
3. The action must be proportionate to the threat, meaning that it cannot be 
unreasonable or excessive. There should be a symmetry between the action and its 
purposes or the desired result.143  
4. The action must also be taken as a last resort after all peaceful means have been 
attempted.144  
In conclusion, this paper is of the position that, as regards to authorship of an armed attack, 
self-defence should include situations where the author of the armed attacks are NSAs. As 
regards the meaning of armed attacks, the paper posits that there has been no consensus as 
to what exactly constitutes armed attacks. In tandem with the realist view however, the 
position should be that the armed attacks should be weighted according to the level of 
damage and should include small successive attacks that eventually lead up to a large scale 
attack. As regards whether self-defence should be used not only against an actual armed 
attack, but also to thwart the threat of imminent use of force by the NSAs.  
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STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND ATTRIBUTION 
INTRODUCTION  
It is conceded that the use of force by a state in the territory of another states not only goes 
against the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, but also those of territorial sovereignty 
and non-intervention as well. Self-defence is however the most important exception to this. 
The inherent right of a state to act in self-defence against another state is upheld in 
international law. As this paper deals with the specific issue of NSAs however, difficulty 
arises as to whether a state would be justified in carrying out actions in self-defence against 
NSAs in the territory of a sovereign state.145  
The law on state responsibility plays a huge role in determining whether the conduct against 
a certain state is legal, as it is known that states cannot take measures on the territory of 
another state against its will. In examining Kenya’s incursion into Somalia on the grounds 
of self-defence, this chapter will delve into the law on state responsibility and determine the 
grounds under which international law allows states to use force against NSAs emanating 
from the territory of another state, in this case Somalia. This chapter analyses whether on 
the basis of the law of state responsibility, whether or not the Republic of Somalia is 
responsible for the actions of Al Shabaab and therefore susceptible to actions in self-defence 
from Kenya. 
 
THE LAWS ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
The substance of the laws on state responsibility are codified by the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(ARSIWA). The law on state responsibility is secondary in nature and consists largely state 
attributability which determines whether certain conduct was embarked on by the state in 
question. States are held responsible under these laws for acts and omissions and their legal 
consequences thereof.146 The Permanent Court of International Justice applied the princip le 
set out in article 1 in a number of cases such as the Phosphates Morocco case;147 that when 
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a state commits an internationally wrongful act against another, responsibility arises as 
between those two states.148 Other cases in which this was set are the Chorzow Factory Case, 
Corfu Channel case, the Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua case and the 
Reparation of Injuries cases.149 
The general rule is that there are two requirements, that first there has to be a wrongful act 
and that the act must be attributable to the state. Under these articles, there consists 
circumstances that preclude wrongfulness of certain acts by states.150 These will assist in 
determining whether the state of Somalia is responsible for the acts of NSAs (The Al 
Shabaab) Vis-à-vis Kenya’s actions in self defence against Al Shabaab in Somalia.151  
As concerns NSAs, the principles of state responsibility serve to establish a link between 
their actions and those of the state itself. The law on state responsibility is very restrictive in 
the attribution of conduct to a state. It follows, that only acts of official state organs, in their 
official capacity can be attributable to the state. Any acts of other actors which do not 
officially in their capacity act on behalf of a state cannot be attributable to a state.152 As 
regards the Al Shabaab, this author concedes that Articles 1 and 2 of the ARSIWA do not 
impute responsibility on the part of Somalia.  
The issue of NSAs can be addressed by the exceptions given in the ARSIWA; those that 
impute responsibility of the state in situations of NSAs. These are such as; that of 
circumstances where the NSAs are acting in the instruction and direction of the state, and 
where the state acknowledges the actions of the NSA as its own.153  
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EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE 
Article 8, ARSIWA  
The first exception to the general rule is found in Article 8 of the ARSIWA, which states in 
part; 
 “The conduct of a person or group of person shall be considered an act of a State 
under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the 
conduct.”154 
Under this provision, conduct can be attributed to a certain state where the NSAs are acting 
on the specific instructions and/or in the scenario where the state has direction or control 
over the NSAs.  
The first instance is conceivably easy to articulate and is widely accepted as it is not 
dependent on any further requirements. When a certain state gives specific instructions to a 
NSA to act in a certain way, the actions of those NSAs are automatically and evidently 
attributable to the state that instructed them.155 In analysing this provision, it is clear that 
there is no evidence to the effect that the Republic of Somalia gave Al Shabaab instruct ions 
of any kind, therefore this provision cannot be used to impute any form of state responsibility 
for the actions of Al Shabaab against Kenya.  
The second instance is whereby the state has direction or control over the NSAs. It follows 
therefore that if this is the case, the state will be responsible for the actions of the NSAs 
whilst under its own direction or control.156 This scenario is however difficult to apply, and 
there have been numerous commentaries as to what exactly the drafters of Article 8 meant 
by ‘direction or control’. There have been two main tests in the history of International law 
that have been used in attempts to explain the meaning of the words in the provision. The 
author however posits that the law ought to be clearer in this, as there is still a lot left to the 
imagination of legal scholars worldwide, which ultimately leads to various conundrums in 
practice.  
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The first of these tests, and that which the author intends to use for purposes of analysis of 
the questions of this paper is the ‘Effective Control’ test. This test was brought forward by 
the ICJ in a myriad of cases, starting with the Nicaragua judgement, where it was stated that 
‘armed attack could be attributed to a state directly through committing the armed attack or 
indirectly, by the sending of or on behalf of a state armed bands, groups or mercenaries 
when the state has effective control of it’.157 The essence of the effective control test is that 
basically a state can be held responsible for acts of NSAs when these said actions were an 
integral part of the operations that were directed or controlled by the state. This, as read, sets 
a very high threshold which can only be said to be achieved if the level of control or direction 
is at a very high level.158  Following this, any conduct of the NSAs that is only incidental ly 
or not so near in association with conduct that is directed or controlled by the state, precludes 
any state responsibility.159 The essence of effective control is that the state involved must be 
involved in the planning of attacks, choosing of targets as well as provide operational 
support and specific directives and instructions. It is said that provision of logistical support 
or other material training does not meet the threshold for ‘effective control’.160    
The other of these tests is the ‘Overall Control’ test, which is the more flexible of the two 
tests and which shall not be used for the purposes of this paper as a result of some of its 
shortcomings, one of which is that the competency of the ICTY was to establish individua l 
criminal responsibility and not state responsibility. The overall control test was applied first 
by the ICTY, in the Tadic trial,161 to determine whether the acts performed by organised 
groups were attributable to the state. In this way, the ICTY could determine whether the 
conflict was international or non-international in nature, making up important rules in 
international humanitarian law. In this test, a state was responsible for the acts of certain 
NSAs when it had ‘overall control’ of these actors beyond mere financing, training or 
                                                                 
157 See the following; Nicaragua v. United States of America , para 11; Wall Advisory Opinion, para 139; 
Territory of Congo, para 146; and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgement) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, 
paras 384, 391, 400 and 401. 
158 Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, 104, para 2. 
159 Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, 104, para 2. 
160 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, para  112. 
161Prosecutor v Tadic, para 137.   
37 
 
equipping.162 The ICJ, in the Genocide cases stated that the overall control test could not be 
used as it stretched too far out the link that the state must have had with the NSAs.163 
Using as has been stated above, the effective control test as regards Article 8, this paper 
posits that Article 8 cannot be invoked to impute responsibility on the part of the Republic 
of Somalia. There is again, no evidence at all to the effect that the Republic of Somalia has 
effective control over the actions of Al Shabaab to effectively warrant actions in self-defence 
by Kenya. 
 
Article 11, ARSIWA 
The second exception is found in Article 11, which reads in part;  
“Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall 
nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law if and to the 
extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.”164 
This article as it reads means that conduct of NSAs can be attributed to the state if the state 
acknowledges and adopts the specific conduct as one of its own; of the state.165 This is 
presumably a very high threshold that is rarely invoked. It was invoked in the ICJ case of 
United States v Iran (Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran) in 1980.166 The essence of 
this article is that both requirements have to be fulfilled, the state has to not only explicit ly 
acknowledge but also adopt the conduct of the NSA as its own.167 It has been said that factual 
acknowledgement or approval or endorsement of the actions cannot suffice to fulfil the 
criteria needed. In the United States v Iran case, it was at the onset decided that the mere 
approval of the actions of the hostage takers was insufficient, but that what made the actions 
of the hostage takers become that of Iran was the policy of not taking adequate steps to end 
the hostage situation to political reasons and the fact that many Iranian authorities complied 
with this and used it as its own policy.168  
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In carrying out an analysis of Article 11, it can be seen that this provision again fails to 
impute responsibility on the Republic of Somalia as there is no evidence to the effect that 
Somalia acknowledged and adopted the actions of Al Shabaab against Kenya as its own.  
 
In the regime of the law on state responsibility, this paper conceives that the tests provided 
for in the exceptions as regards private actors are extremely high, and even though with good 
reason, can sometimes rid a state of the opportunity to invoke self-defence against NSAs, 
when there is clear evidence of actions that warrant self-defence. In this particular case, the 
author argues that the only way in which Kenya may successfully invoke state responsibility 
for purposes of self-defence, is through a negative connotation that a state may not interfere 
with the territorial integrity of a sovereign state unless with the explicit consent of a state. 
There has been evidence provided in the chapters before this one that Somalia consented to 
Kenya’s operations in self-defence. This is shown in the Joint Communique presented to the 
UNSC detailing the specifics of the incursion.  
Notwithstanding this, the author however, as mentioned before does not agree with the 
notion that self-defence can only be used against actions of NSAs which meet the thresholds 
of Articles 8 or 11. In line with the realist approach of this paper, and with the increasing 
proliferation of attacks by NSAs, following such a restrictive approach would be detrimenta l 
to the rights of a state such as Kenya to protect its territorial integrity. For this reason, this 
chapter in the next part, discusses whether there are other avenues other than those given 
explicitly in the law on state responsibility that may warrant self-defence. This, is done with 
adequate cognizance of the need to balance the avenues in which states may successfully 
invoke and carry out force in the name of self-defence on the one hand and on the other hand, 





COMPLEMENTARY TO STATE RESPONSIBILITY?  
AGGRESSION  
‘Aggression is the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the UN, as set out in this Definition’169   
The ICJ, in its Nicaragua decision, stated that self-defence was not only limited to those 
situations where a state can be held responsible for an armed attack but also where the court 
could establish a state link by relying on the definition of Aggression as given by the UNGA. 
Article 3 of the list annexed to the definition of aggression by UNGA listed several acts 
which qualified as aggression. Article 3(g) which is highly cited stated that (as reiterated by 
the ICJ in the Nicaragua case), ‘...the sending by or on behalf of a state or armed bands, 
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state 
of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein…’  
The questions here is first whether the Aggression as defined is the same as an armed attack 
and whether ‘substantial involvement’ by a state in the acts listed amounts to a suitable state 
link to the conduct committed so as to then essentially impute state responsibility.  
As to the first question it should be noted that, the term aggression is a wider term than armed 
attacks and includes economic and ideological aggression as well.170 Self-defence under the 
UN Charter is only limited to armed attacks, and one might see the reason of this, that the 
drafters set to only restrict self-defence to armed attack to avoid the unilateral proliferat ions 
of acts of war by countries. Only the gravest forms of aggression (armed aggression) 
constitute an armed attack.  
As for the second question, it should be noted that the ICJ in its Nicaragua judgement 
imputed that an armed attack could also consist the sending by or behalf of a state of armed 
groups, bands, irregulars or mercenaries in the sense of Article 3(g) of the UNGA definit ion 
of aggression, including substantial involvement provided the scale and effects of the attack 
would exceed a mere frontier incident.171 By applying Article 3(g) of the definition, to the 
exercise of the right of self- defence, it means that the right was not only limited to the 
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situations where conditions of Article 8 or 11 are fulfilled, but also in situations where there 
is merely substantial involvement of a state in the conduct of NSAs. 
 
 THE NOTION OF A FAILED STATE? 
Another notion that has grappled the issue of attacks by NSAs is the exercise of the rights of 
self defence against a state that has failed or is unwilling to prevent an attack by private 
individuals. The principle followed under this rule is the due diligence rule, which forms 
part of International law.  
Under the due diligence rule, a state is under a duty to protect rather than a duty to abstain, 
and failure to do so will entail the commission of an internationally wrongful act. States have 
a duty to protect other states from attacks conducted by private individuals or NSAs 
emanating from their territory by among other things combating the hostile use of force of 
NSAs against foreign states.172 This duty was drawing from the Declaration of Friendly 
Relations which essentially proclaims that no state shall organise, assist, foment, finance or 
tolerate subversive terrorist or armed activities.173  
The threshold of this duty is that it must be carried out by states due diligently and not that 
it must be absolute.174 The question begs then, can this be a reason for a state to impute state 
responsibility and carry out actions in self-defence when another fails to carry out this duty 
diligently? The due diligence rule however does not apply to cases where a state provides 
support material, logistical or other form as save for extreme cases, such conduct will never 
amount to attributability of the conduct of private actors to a state.175 In the Nicaragua case, 
the United States’ active involvement in the Contras was condemned as against the princip le 
of non-intervention; that is, a duty to abstain and not to protect other states.176 It follows 
therefore that support of this kind is a breach of the duty to abstain and does not impute a 
breach of the due diligence rule as regards actions by NSAs in this case. The tolerating of 
                                                                 
172 Lillich R and Paxman J.M, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 
27 AUL Rev, 1977, 261. 
173 GA Res. 2625 (XXV). See also, S.C. Res. 1189, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3915th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1189, 1998.  
174 Mazzeschi P, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States, 35, 
German Yearbook of International Law , 1992, 34-36. 
175 Lillich R and Paxman J.M, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 
261. 
176Mazzeschi P, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States, 34-36. 
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presence of armed actors can be an example of how a state has not acted due diligently, but 
cannot warrant actions in self defence against a state.  
As regards the notion of a failed state, it should be noted that the precursor to a state abiding 
by the due diligence rule is that it should have a functioning governmental apparatus capable 
and willing to combat the actions of the NSAs. If the governmental apparatus has failed, 
other issues creep up. As we have seen and as is the subject of this paper, there is a 
proliferation of dangerous armed non-state groups that emanate from the territories of 
sovereign states which have most of the time been subject to civil and political strife. The 
NSAs seek refuge there and for political and other reasons find a prying ground to expand 
and carry out armed attacks on that state and others. That is indeed, the storyline of an armed 
group like Al Shabaab. The actions of such groups can only be considered actions of the 
state is those individuals are exercising some form of governmental authority.177 Here, there 
is presupposed to be either a partial or total collapse of the sovereign government.  
It is the position of this paper however that international law would be crude in allowing for 
the use of self-defence against states which are inherently because of certain circumstances 
incapable of preventing attack. International law should not voluntarily injure a state that is 
in a fragile state because of its structural inability to prevent attacks. With the consent of the 
‘fragile state’ however, states can work with it to make sure there is a coordination of efforts 
to fight the armed NSAs.  
Taking into account these other sources of state responsibility complementary to the actual 
substantive law on state responsibility, the author maintains the position that none of these 
can be effectively used to impute state responsibility on Somalia for the actions of Al 
Shabaab. The only recourse Kenya could have, is to claim self-defence and a justifica t ion 
based on Somalia’s actual consent and willingness to the actions by Kenya. The author 
however sees a lacuna in the law in that the law on state responsibility is very much 
restricted, to the point of rendering a state’s right to act in self-defence null and void. This 
paper posits that a more flexible approach than those given in Articles 8 and 11 be 
followed.178 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research paper set out to study the legitimacy of self-defence against NSAs in 
International law today. The hypotheses of this study was that self-defence against attacks 
by NSAs that emanate from the territory of a sovereign state, is permitted under internationa l 
law.  
The paper set out on a premise of the realist school of thought, and in this is, the author is of 
the position that international laws should be tailor made to meet the realities that the world 
faces; that international law should be a living, breathing branch of law that should not be 
stagnant but adapt to the numerous changes that globalisation and the natural growth of the 
world has brought about. The author set out to write this paper on the premise that, 
international law could not be effective if it remains archaic and does not meet the needs of 
the changing community of states and the world at large.  
On a backdrop of the recent proliferation of dangerous and conceivably powerful NSAs in 
the plane of armed conflict in many parts of the world, the study set out to analyse what 
exactly the legal parameters surrounding states’ right of self-defence in relation to NSAs is, 
and in what circumstances this would be permitted. The study noted that many countries as 
mentioned in the paper, claimed their right to defend themselves against attacks by NSAs 
who attacked them, but that still, this was an issue in contention in international law. Taking 
into cognizance the fact that the UN Charter was put in place to ensure among other things 
but most importantly that peace and unity prevailed in the world, the study was necessary to 
carry out because of the fact that many states continually waged acts of war and used force 
against NSAs in other sovereign states.  
The study was carried out to show that there needed to be clarity in the law, in order to ensure 
that the very real threat of NSAs was dealt with, while still preserving the purposes of the 
UN Charter in Article 1(1). The author concedes that states should not be left to unilatera l ly 
wage war in the name of self-defence from NSAs when the law is not entirely clear as this 
brings a travesty to the purpose of the UN Charter. The author also concedes however, that 
the issue of armed NSAs needs to be dealt with, as in the world today, they pose a threat to 
the survival of mankind.  
It is in this tangent then, that the paper sought to gain the answers to the following questions.  
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Whether it is legally justifiable, for a state to claim self-defence against NSAs in the 
territory of another sovereign state? 
What are the legal parameters surrounding the attribution of state responsibility on 
a sovereign state in whose territory the NSAs emanate from?  
The paper set out to gain answers to these questions through carrying out a discussion on a 
practical case, that of the Operation Linda Nchi, which was the 2011 Kenyan incursion into 
Somalia in self-defence against the terrorist group Al Shabaab. This practical example was 
used in the study in analysing the various issues in law that were discussed. The paper 
discussed the general law on the use of force and the self-defence exception in the UN 
Charter and in customary international law and thereafter, the law on state responsibility as 
regards the issue of NSAs.  
 
Authorship of Armed Attacks 
This research paper has shown that the UN Charter does not explicitly state the authorship 
of armed attacks when it mentions self-defence. The paper is of the position that, the 
authorship of armed attacks in relation to self-defence should include NSAs as well as states. 
Failure to do so, would be against the realist school of thought, and would open up states to 
a myriad of attacks by NSAs that they cannot ultimately defend themselves from. The 
authorship of armed attack should include NSAs because in the world today, NSAs continue 
to threaten the sovereignty of peoples and their states should be able to protect their 
sovereignty.  
 
Threat of Armed Attack 
This paper has also shown that self-defence, should not only be permitted in the case of an 
actual materialised armed attack, but also against the threat of armed attack. This, the paper 
holds, is the correct position of the law, but should contain limits. The threat of the armed 
attack must be imminent, instant, overwhelming, and absolutely necessary to thwart the 
threat and must leave no choice or moment for deliberation. In these cases then, self-defence 
should be permitted. It would be a complete absurdity to expect that states should sit and 
wait for attacks that they view as imminent to materialise. The use of force as well as the 
44 
 
threat of use of force is prohibited in the UN Charter. Further, the self-defence exception in 
Article 51 should also then be as relates to force and threat of force.  
 
State Responsibility for Non-State Actors 
This study has also set out clearly that self-defence against NSAs should be permitted in 
cases where the armed actions of the NSAs against a particular state, are either directly 
controlled or instructed by the particular sovereign state in which they emanate from. Self-
defence should also be permitted in instances where a particular state has acknowledged and 
adopted the actions of the NSAs as its own. This is in tandem with the international law on 
the responsibility of states. It is the position of this paper that, without determining clearly 
and evidently the state link to the actions of the NSAs, it is illegal to use force against the 
territory of another sovereign state. Furthermore, this paper is of the position that claiming 
state responsibility and owing to the failure of a state or its apparatus in thwarting a threat 
because it is a failed state, and thereby using force against it, is not in good faith and should 
not be entertained as an argument for the using of force against it. Once a state has declared 
its consent however to the actions in self-defence of another state against these NSAs as was 
the case in the Operation Linda Nchi that the state should be permitted to carry out these 
actions. 
Conclusion 
This paper, ultimately is of the position that the law need not be written a fresh, but only 
clarified as regards these issues. Self-defence against NSAs, should be permitted in 
international law, but in a very strict manner. There should be limits, as discussed in the 
previous paragraphs that ultimately ensure that it is not easy for a state to launch attacks 
against another state, while claiming self-defence. States should not unilaterally use force 
against distant threats. This, makes sure that the world does not return to its previous state, 
where for instance states could wage war because they had a ‘just cause’ to do so. This paper 
realises that the UN Charter provisions on the use of force are extremely important, in order 
to preserve the peace and unity in the world. Self-defence against the attacks and the threat 
of attacks by dangerous armed NSAs should be permitted in very stringent ways. The law 
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